Commentary on Kidd by Olson, Kenneth
University of Windsor
Scholarship at UWindsor
OSSA Conference Archive OSSA 7
Jun 6th, 9:00 AM - Jun 9th, 5:00 PM
Commentary on Kidd
Kenneth Olson
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive
Part of the Philosophy Commons
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences at Scholarship at UWindsor. It has
been accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized administrator of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please
contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca.
Kenneth Olson, "Commentary on Kidd" ( June 6, 2007). OSSA Conference Archive. Paper 85.
http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA7/papersandcommentaries/85
 
Olson, K. (2007). Commentary on Andrew Kidd: “The limits of dissensus: The case of ‘intelligent design’” 
In H.V. Hansen, et. al. (Eds.), Dissensus and the Search for Common Ground, CD-ROM (pp. 1-2). 
Windsor, ON: OSSA. 
Copyright © 2007, the author. 
Commentary on Andrew Kidd: “The Limits of Dissensus: The 
Case of ‘Intelligent Design’” 
 
KENNETH OLSON 
 
Test Development 
Law School Admission Council 
662 Penn St., Box 40 
Newtown, PA 18940-0040 U.S.A. 
kolson@lsac.org 
 
 
Kidd describes two methods of reasoning supposedly employed by Darwin, both put 
forward by Darwin’s contemporaries in Victorian England. These are “analogical 
deduction,” which he attributes to John Herschel, and “consilience of inductions,” 
ascribed to William Whewell. Kidd then attempts to show that the arguments of 
intelligent design theorists do not conform to these methods of reasoning. 
Kidd’s critique of intelligent design would be more effective if he could tell us 
why anyone writing today should be guided by the canons of these eminent Victorians. 
He introduces his discussion with the sentence “Before looking at the arguments of the 
intelligent design advocates, we should first examine the initial arguments used by the 
scientists they are responding to” (p. 1). But why should we? Surely the design arguments 
stand or fall on their own. To fault them for not employing the same methods of 
reasoning as their opponents seems to beg the question in favor of the latter. Kidd needs 
to do more to show that these methods have the universal validity he seems to attribute to 
them. 
What, exactly, is analogical deduction? Kidd’s example is Darwin’s comparison 
between natural selection in the wild and artificial selection in domestication. I can see 
how this is an analogy. In what sense is it deductive? Later we read: “The use of such 
deductive analogies by Dembski differs greatly from their use by Herschel and Darwin, 
however, in that they [sic] are not axiomatic; they make no attempt to deduce their 
hypotheses upon [sic] laws which may be inferred from observations…” (p. 3). 
If a hypothesis is deduced, in what sense is it hypothetical? The appropriate role 
of analogy would seem to be in suggesting hypotheses. Once one has a hypothesis, one 
can see what follows from it together with other statements one believes. That is the role 
of deduction. If one of these deductive consequences conflicts with experience, either the 
hypothesis or one of these other beliefs has to be given up. Where one’s hypotheses come 
from is of little consequence. They may as well be arrived at by consulting sacred texts or 
a Ouija board. Or from analogical thinking. But, I repeat, this process does not appear to 
be deductive in any way. Perhaps Kidd is trying to address this problem when he says 
that according to Herschel “scientific theories are axiomatic, and that laws governing 
natural processes can be discerned through empirical understanding” (p. 2). But this 
unclear statement is pretty much all we get. Is some kind of special insight or intuition 
being postulated here? 
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Kidd accuses Dembski and other proponents design of arguing as follows: if it is 
conceivable that x is designed, and if we have not yet found an adequate naturalistic 
explanation for x, then x must be designed (p. 4). I leave it to others to judge whether this 
is a fair interpretation of Dembski.; it is hard to believe that anyone would consciously 
employ such a patently flawed pattern of reasoning. Kidd rightly points out that a 
scientific theory may allow for gaps that need to be filled in by further research. 
Indeed, perhaps Kidd should have stuck to trying to show in detail that the 
writings of intelligent design advocates tend not to conform to standard “epistemic 
norms” or criteria for judging scientific theories, such as those that Kidd attributes to 
Ruse: “internal coherence, external consistency, predictive accuracy, fertility, unificatory 
power, and simplicity” (p. 2). 
Surely, Kidd’s main point is right (even if difficult to extract): that intelligent 
design is presented as a competing scientific theory to evolution, and as such, should be 
held to universal standards for judging scientific theories. Support for intelligent design 
as a scientific theory from the domains of law, politics, religion, etc. is simply irrelevant. 
It involves a (mis)application of extraneous rules of discourse—a “conflation of debates,” 
as Kidd puts it. 
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